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Midway through Zoë Wicomb’s 1987 work You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town, Frieda 
Shenton and her family gather dockside to bid farewell to Frieda’s Great Uncle 
Hermanus, as he prepares to board a ship bound for Canada. The family is tense with 
anticipation and nervousness. As “Coloured” South Africans during the apartheid era, the 
Shentons understand emigration as freedom bought at the cost of great distance from 
one’s relations and community.1 Trying to reassure his family, Uncle Hermanus tells 
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1 Under apartheid legislation, the capitalized term “Coloured” referred to people of racially mixed 
parentage who were categorized as neither “Black” nor “White.” The unstable and tautological nature of 
such distinctions has been well documented; see, for instance, Judith Raiskin’s Snow on the Canefields 
(210-214) for a discussion relating to Wicomb’s work, and Mohamed Adhikari’s Not White Enough, Not 
Black Enough and “From Narratives of Miscegenation to Post-Modernist Re-Imagining” for a more 
thorough historicization of conceptions of coloured identity in South Africa. Despite its complicated 
history, the question of coloured identity remains central to post-apartheid life in South Africa. In this 
paper, the capitalized term “Coloured” specifically references the apartheid category; the lower-case term, 
on the other hand, refers to a complex and dynamic form of identification resulting from a range of social, 
historical, and political contingencies. These contingencies range from the apartheid legislation that reified 
colouredness as a falsely stable racialized identity, to the agency exerted by South Africans who claim both 
European and African heritage in articulating their own racial and political identity. This conception of 
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them, “Man, there’s no problem; we’re mos all Juropeens when we get to Canada,” at 
which point he promptly vomits into the circle of assembled relatives, splattering shoes.2 
The scene’s sudden turn towards the visceral is unsettling both for the characters and for 
the reader: “[T]he old man, bewildered in the ring created by his own regurgitation, 
staggered a grotesque dance around the puddle, looking confusedly at us,” a 
disorientation which prompts his family to arrange themselves so as to hide the pool of 
vomit from their relative.3 The unsightly mess punctures the illusion of a happy send-off 
and reinforces the ambivalence of Hermanus’s flight from a country in which he is only a 
partial citizen. The racial hierarchies of apartheid South Africa have forced him to choose 
between perpetual discrimination at home and familial abandonment through exile, and 
the choice sickens him. Worse still, he is in no way certain that he will live as a 
“Juropeen,” a white person, upon his arrival in Canada. Fear of the potential rejection of 
his brown body prompts in Uncle Hermanus a political purging; his vomit represents an 
involuntary reaction to the dynamics of race and to the multiple uncertainties of a future 
far from his family. 
This visceral turn is less bewildering when read in the context of the politics of 
embodiment at work in Wicomb’s fiction. You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town repeatedly 
engages with the meanings of the unruly body and its relation to South African political 
culture. The text oozes with the material traces of the human form, its excesses and its 
disruptions. Fluids secrete; garbage accumulates; the body itches, desires, and abandons. 
Rather than attending solely to that which individual human bodies reject, however, You 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
coloured identity follows Adhikari’s social constructivist model; see “From Narratives of Miscegenation,” 
13-17 and passim, for an overview of this model. 
2 Wicomb, You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town, 84.  
3 Ibid., 84-5. 
  Whittington   3
Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town uses waste as a lens through which to interrogate patterns 
of abjection and marginalization at multiple scales, from the individual to the national. 
The entire body becomes, in Wicomb’s text, a register of the political and ethical 
ramifications of acceptance and disavowal; in the context of late-apartheid South Africa, 
what the body bears and rejects, what individuals carry and what they lose, bristles with 
political significance.  
The very form of the work resists order and holism. Structured as a series of 
linked but chronologically dispersed episodes, You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town is 
narrated by protagonist Frieda Shenton, whose mixed-race Griqua ancestry marks her as 
“Coloured” according to the logic of the apartheid regime. Though readable as individual 
narratives, the ten sections of the work form a roughly coherent whole that traces Frieda’s 
development from early childhood into her adult life as a politically aware subject. That 
the work also draws on Wicomb’s own life in selective and playful ways compounds its 
hybrid status; like Wicomb, Frieda grows up in Little Namaqualand, becomes a writer, 
and emigrates to Britain. But Wicomb takes pains to call such autobiographical readings 
into question: significant differences appear between the narrator’s experiences and those 
of the author, including Frieda’s enrolment at a white school in her youth and, later, her 
return to South Africa after many years away. Wicomb also introduces metafictional 
turns in order to complicate easy identifications; the most notable of these turns involves 
the death, and later resurrection, of Frieda’s mother within the world of the text. Wicomb 
has claimed that such tactics are part of “a deliberate response to the popular idea of 
black women’s writing as autobiography,” an idea that relegates all fiction and non-
fiction by black women to the supposedly “minor genre” of the personal and the 
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documentary.4 Part fictionalized autobiography, part short story collection, part 
künstlerroman, You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town is a generic cipher that indicates the 
inadequacy of any single form for the communication of its ideas. It is perhaps best 
considered a novel in fragments, a deliberately broken work only loosely bound together. 
That Wicomb’s fragmentary meditation on waste should appear during the late stages of 
apartheid is not surprising. The system itself was itself approaching its own dissolution: 
although hardly yet in its death throes, the regime was in 1987 subject to increasing 
external and internal pressure in the form of armed insurrection, widespread political 
unrest, and international blockades and sanctions.  
As a mode of political control, apartheid sustained itself through related practices 
of human and resource exploitation that hinged on selection, valuation, and exclusion. 
Though their beginnings lay earlier, scientific theories of race and biological difference 
proliferated in late nineteenth century South Africa (as elsewhere) and served to subtend 
ideas of white superiority through recourse to Darwinian concepts of evolution.5 These 
theories provided much of the intellectual justification not only for the casual racism of 
daily life in a segregated society, but for the legislated racism that sought to reify and 
normalize that segregation both before and during the apartheid era.6 This systematized 
approach to material embodiment is central to You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town: as 
Judith Raiskin has pointed out, Wicomb’s novel emphasizes that for all its social and 
discursive aspects, apartheid was experienced as a physical phenomenon, “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Olver and Meyer, “Zoë Wicomb on David’s Story,” 139-40. See also Wicomb, “To Hear the Variety of 
Discourses,” 42. For a discussion of the persistent misreading of You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town as 
straightforward autobiography, see Andrew van der Vlies, “‘I’m Only Grateful that It’s Not a Cape Town 
Book,’ or: Zoë Wicomb, Textuality, Propriety, and the Proprietary,” 9-12. 
5 Saul Dubow, Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, 1-19 and passim. 
6 Ibid., 9. 
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classification and placement” of the racialized body.7 Pigment and other signs of ancestry 
became, in this system, legible traces in an elaborate hermeneutics of bodily worth. 
Bodies deemed valuable were prized and protected, while others were abused and 
neglected.  
More recently, Achille Mbembe has tied the valuation of individual bodies to the 
valuation of other material forms. In “Aesthetics of Superfluity,” Mbembe characterizes 
apartheid as a doubly exploitative system built around notions of superfluity: gold, long a 
key aspect of the South African economy, was an inherently superfluous metal (in that it 
has little use-value, only exchange-value) dug up by a largely black army of reserve 
labor.8 As it scored and undercut the landscape, the mining-based economy of South 
Africa depended on black labor while simultaneously devaluing it as a means of 
sustaining a racially segregated society.9 Racism, under the apartheid system, was “a 
transactional practice with radical implications for the distribution of death—as raw black 
labor was acquired and intensively consumed.”10 One’s place within the apartheid 
hierarchy dictated one’s bodily proximity to danger, mortality, and decay. 
While this system was most injurious to black South Africans, its physical and 
psychological distortions affected other groups as well. Wicomb’s fiction is notable for 
its concern with the experience of coloured South Africans, who occupied a vexed 
position in the apartheid hierarchy. Though allowed certain freedoms denied to black 
South Africans, coloured individuals were still burdened with what Frantz Fanon has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Raiskin, Snow on the Canefields, 219. 
8 Mbembe, “Aesthetics of Superfluity,” 41-2. See also Charles Feinstein, Economic History, 106-109. 
9 Mbembe, “Aesthetics of Superfluity,” 43. 
10 Ibid. 
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called the “epidermalization” of inferiority that accompanies colonial racism.11 As a 
writer of both European and African heritage, Wicomb has frequently addressed the 
politics of coloured existence in the sharply racialized environments of apartheid and 
post-apartheid South Africa. In her 1998 essay “Shame and Identity: The Case of the 
Coloured in South Africa,” Wicomb locates a persistent stigma in the coloured body: 
whereas, under apartheid, coloured South Africans felt an imperative to downplay their 
black heritage, the post-apartheid era replaced this form of shame with its obverse. As the 
liberation movement gathered strength and eventually triumphed, Wicomb claims, the 
shame of being coloured became tied to the fact that one’s black ancestors had engaged 
in sexual collaboration with white colonizers. “Miscegenation,” Wicomb writes, “the 
origins of which lie within a discourse of ‘race’, concupiscence, and degeneracy, 
continues to be bound up with shame.”12 This narrative of coloured “concupiscence,” 
disproportionately leveled at women, is for Wicomb an unsatisfactory reversal; rather 
than simply inverting the shame of racialized embodiment, Wicomb instead seeks “to 
consider the actual materiality of black bodies that bear the marked pigmentation of 
miscegenation, and the way in which that relates to political culture.”13 The coloured 
body, site and symbol of desire’s breaking of taboo in a racially-stratified South Africa, is 
for Wicomb dangerously charged with political meaning, caught between worlds. 
An early instance of Wicomb’s longer diagnosis of the nuances of the apartheid 
racial hierarchy, You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town invokes the persistent needs and 
functions of the material body in order to testify to its centrality to lived experience. The 
case of Great Uncle Hermanus is typical of the concern with embodiment present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 11. 
12 Wicomb, “Shame and Identity,” 92. 
13 Ibid., 93. 
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throughout the novel: his body instantiates the conflicts inherent in belonging to a racially 
charged polity on both a metonymic and metaphorical level. That is, his vomit indexes a 
historical experience of nervousness and racialized discomfort while it symbolizes a 
rejection of the crisis of embodiment faced by coloured South Africans. Bodily waste, 
like other forms of waste, becomes a trope for larger and more complex systems of 
acceptance and rejection that serve to delimit individual and national subjectivities. As 
will be seen, Wicomb’s aesthetic and ethical project is energized by a dual definition of 
“waste” that is in operation and in tension within the text: waste as that which is 
unwanted or excessive, and waste as an unhappy loss of something precious. To talk of 
human waste might usually be to refer to that which is gladly shed, but it can also 
encompass that which it is horrific to lose, including the lives wasted under a brutal 
regime. This distinction is important precisely because of the profound ways in which 
Wicomb troubles it in the text. By conflating excess waste and precious waste, Wicomb 
evokes the full horror of apartheid’s objectification, valuation, and elimination of the 
human individual. 
 
Racism, Abjection, and Apartheid 
The notion that individual subjectivity is constructed through processes of rejection and 
abjection has a long history. In Purity and Danger (1966), her groundbreaking 
anthropological study of human relations to waste, Mary Douglas describes dirt as 
nothing more or less than “matter out of place.” “Where there is dirt,” she writes, “there 
is system. Dirt is the byproduct of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so 
  Whittington   8
far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.”14 The body serves as the locus 
for many of the rituals and rules by which cultures determine what constitutes cleanliness 
and dirtiness, order and disorder, the subject and the abject. But the body possesses an 
almost endless potential to signify beyond itself: “The body,” Douglas writes, “is a model 
which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries 
which are threatened or precarious.”15 As a metonym for the larger processes of exclusion 
and rejection that animate apartheid existence, the coloured body in You Can’t Get Lost 
in Cape Town serves to register the violence done to entire populations, just as it registers 
acts of resistance. 
Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject, articulated in The Powers of Horror (1980), 
offers a more focused interpretation of the individual’s relation to waste and breakdown. 
For Kristeva, the abject is that which threatens the individual with knowledge of the 
permeability and fragility of life and subjecthood; the category therefore includes obvious 
signs of death, but also of decay more generally, as in rotten food and garbage. The abject 
also includes those bodily products deemed impure and unclean, like blood, vomit, and 
feces, which pass through the barriers of the body, and which therefore betray its 
permeability and instability.16 As Kristeva frames it, “refuse and corpses show me what I 
permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are 
what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death”.17 Confronting the 
abject, she argues, yields a horrified realization that the subject is not discrete and 
coherent, but is rather in fluid exchange with the world around it, including those things 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Douglas, Purity and Danger, 44. 
15 Ibid., 142. 
16 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 5. 
17 Ibid., 3. 
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deemed unclean. The abject is that which debunks the myth of bodily and subjective 
wholeness. 
Abjection provides part of the answer as to how individuals relate to waste, and 
the role it plays in subject-formation. As Gay Hawkins has pointed out, however, 
psychoanalytic conceptions of waste tend to offer limited and ahistorical understandings 
of the multiple ways in which human societies interact with bodily and material 
byproducts; the tendency is to depict a universalized account of bodily horror rather than 
contextualized and variegated accounts of localized human-waste relations.18 Kristeva’s 
understanding of the psychology of abjection becomes most useful for the analysis of 
Wicomb’s work when considered in conjunction with the wider social and political 
systems that enforced apartheid on a daily basis. Derek Hook has posited abjection as a 
useful explanatory model for the psychological patterns that subtended the larger system 
of apartheid. While it often confers obvious benefits for the oppressor, he argues, race 
prejudice is not only about the maintenance of socio-economic dominance; the 
persistence and vehemence of prejudice in the face of reasoned argument betray the 
irrational roots of racism. Whether institutionalized, as in apartheid South Africa, or 
latent, racism represents “a set of phenomena that is as psychical as it is political in 
nature, affective as it is discursive, subjective as it is ideological.”19 Looked at in this 
way, the body of apartheid legislation passed between 1949 and 1950 in South Africa 
represents a monumental abjection, inasmuch as the regime depended on racial difference 
and separation to constitute a white Afrikaner identity. By strictly limiting physical 
interaction and coexistence, laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hawkins, Ethics of Waste 3-4. 
19 Hook, “Racism as Abjection,” 676. Emphasis in original. 
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the Group Areas Act (1950), and the Immorality Act (1950) encoded racism as a physical 
rejection of the racial “other,” violently enforcing a distance between whites and non-
whites.20 Such socio-political encoding reinforces the irrational, affective dimension of 
racism, which can then in turn feed back into processes of legislation and governance.21 
To meditate on waste, as Wicomb does, is to call into question the political structures of 
separation and suppression that apartheid effected, and their relation to embodied 
experience. Wicomb’s distressed and unruly bodies evoke the anxieties of a political 
body that rejects and denigrates that which threatens the illusion of its wholeness and 
integrity; they demonstrate how apartheid thrusts aside non-white individuals in order 
that it might sustain the foundational lie of inequality and racial difference. 
 
Waste and the Individual Body 
From the outset of Wicomb’s novel, the political body asserts itself. The arrival of Mr. 
Weedon in his sleek automobile draws the schoolchildren of Frieda’s Namaqualand 
village outside, their fingers jammed in their noses, and precipitates a matter-of-fact 
emptying of bladders and bowels in nearby bushes.22 The children of the village, Frieda 
included, live close to their own waste, in a situation of desperate poverty that is totally 
lacking in modern infrastructure. At one point, facing a forced move to a crowded 
coloured “location” with newer amenities, Frieda’s father dreams that they will 
eventually escape to a humble farm home, asking rhetorically, “Who needs a water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 J.M. Coetzee notes that this legislated abjection is necessary only in a context in which sexual interaction 
across racial lines is not only possible but highly likely: “[A]partheid was causally overdetermined. It did 
indeed flower out of self-interest and greed, but also out of desire, and the denial of desire. In its greed, it 
demanded black bodies in all their physicality in order to burn up their energy as labor. In its anxiety about 
black bodies, it also made laws to banish them from sight” (“Apartheid Thinking,” 164).  
21 Hook, “Racism as Abjection,” 695.  
22 Wicomb, You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town, 1. 
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lavatory in the veld?”23 But he soon comes to value relocation and its conveniences, 
linking them with progress: “Brains are for making money,” he tells Frieda, “and when 
you come home with your Senior Certificate, you won’t come back to a pack of 
Hottentots crouching in straight lines on the edge of the village.”24 Modernization is a 
march away from the leavings of the body, towards sterile cleanliness. Furthermore, as 
Mr. Shenton’s quotation shows, this urge to modernize is bound up with the racial 
hierarchies of apartheid. He and his family can dream of mobility in the realm of 
household conveniences like plumbing because their designation as “Coloured” offers 
slightly more opportunities for advancement than those available to South Africans 
labeled “Black.” The Khoikhoi of Namaqualand, for example—people Mr. Shenton calls 
by the incorrect, pejorative name “Hottentots”—have more limited access to modern 
facilities.  
Mr. Shenton is sharply aware of such racial distinctions, but not in a critical way; 
he and his wife both participate in the status games of race dictated by apartheid. When 
Frieda returns to South Africa after an extended period in Britain, her father talks to her 
of the changing social climate of the country in terms of developments at the local 
medical clinic, adopting a standpoint caught between coloured victimhood and coloured 
racism: “Oh you’ll find it very different now. It’s not the old business of waiting in the 
yard; there’s even a waiting room for us now with a nice clean water lavatory. Not that 
these Hotnos know how to use it…”25 The token improvements of a flush toilet and 
waiting room (which Frieda in fact discovers still to be closed to non-whites) serve for 
Mr. Shenton as both an index of improving race relations and an opportunity to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 29. 
24 Ibid., 30. 
25 Ibid., 105. 
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distinguish himself as superior to darker-skinned Africans. In order to define themselves, 
the Shentons abject the Khoi elements of their Griqua heritage and embrace the white 
elements of that heritage; they see themselves as upwardly mobile and culturally, if not 
physiologically, European. More specifically, they cast themselves as British: in their 
desire to inch up the social ladder of South Africa, the Shentons cling to the Scottish 
ancestor who provided their last name, and they set about learning English rather than the 
Afrikaans spoken by the surrounding community. The links between language, 
infrastructure, and cultural mobility are punningly enacted in the Shentons’ growing 
grasp of the language: in the first story in the collection, “Bowl Like Hole,” the family 
gleans valuable pronunciation tips on the sly from Mr. Weedon, learning to pronounce 
the word “bowl” not as “bowel” but so as to rhyme with “hole.”26 The humorously 
imperfect instance of linguistic mimicry slyly suggests a movement from the crushing 
poverty of bowel-voiding children at the story’s outset, to the promise of containment and 
convenience offered by the toilet bowl. Ethnolinguistic ascent through the apartheid 
structure—the perfection of their use of English—accompanies shifting relations of the 
body to its own waste.27 
The politics of waste apply to more than just shit; other fluids similarly excite 
feelings of fear and anxiety. When Mr. Shenton belatedly and awkwardly speaks to 
Frieda about the menstruation that had long before started for her, he stresses 
preparedness and ritual: “You must fetch a bucket of water in the evenings and wash the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 9. 
27 The Shentons’ disavowal of their Griqua heritage as unclean is echoed in Wicomb’s 2001 novel David’s 
Story, in which the father of the titular protagonist chastises David, an anti-apartheid militant, for his 
interest in Andrew Le Fleur, an ancestor and important figure in Griqua history: “Look what it’s taken your 
mother and me, sweat and blood, to shake off the Griquaness, the shame and the filth and the idleness, and 
what do you do? Go rolling right back in the gutter, crawling into all kinds of dirty hovels to speak with old 
folks about old Griqua rubbish, encouraging the backwardness” (Wicomb, David’s Story, 23).   
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rags at night… have them ready for the next month … always be prepared.”28 But he 
does not realize that Frieda is already aware of, if not using, disposable pads bought at the 
local chemists’. Material progress, again, distances the body’s waste, negating the need 
for the messy engagement with the self that characterizes poverty. Not only poverty, but 
servitude as well: Frieda sees education as a way out of the life of cleaning up after others 
that would otherwise await her. She imagines this servitude in terms of the body’s fluids: 
“A terrifying image of a madam’s menstrual rags that I have to wash swirls liquid red 
through my mind.”29 For Frieda, apartheid enacts politically defined relations of 
proximity and distance to that which the body produces in excess; class and race 
divisions, amplified by unequal infrastructure development, ensure that some can shun 
the body that others cannot. 
 
Waste and the Economic Body 
The material goods and infrastructure that mediate the waste of the body—
running water, the toilet, the disposable pad—hint at the broader metaphors of industrial 
production and waste that operate in You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town. If poverty in the 
novel can be measured by proximity to one’s own waste, it also usually entails proximity 
to that which is rejected by society at large. In the first chapter, Mr. Weedon and Mr. 
Shenton visit a mine where black laborers separate valuable gypsum from waste earth; 
though poisoning their bodies, the workers earn meager wages and cigarettes as a reward 
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while they strip the land of value.30 Just as the young, defecating children watched Mr. 
Weedon from the bushes, he gazes with fascination at the muscular torsos of the men 
digging out the mineral to be used in finishing the homes of wealthier South Africans. 
The work is hard, and the dust that powders the laborers’ arms also reddens their eyes, 
hinting at other, uncalculated damage to the body. Weedon, however, appears aroused by 
the scene, fixated on the extrication of gypsum from an anthropomorphic and sexualized 
earth: “then down the dark torsos fell, and a crash of thunder as the blades struck the 
earth, baring her bosom of rosy gypsum.”31 The desire prompted by the sight of the black 
laborers is so strong that Weedon eventually must look away. Frieda, though absent from 
the scene, proceeds to narrate her own metaphors for the exhausted earth:  
And so midst all that making of poetry, two prosaic mounds rose on either 
side of the deepening pit. One of these would ultimately blend in with the 
landscape; fine dust cones would spin off it in the afternoons just as they spun 
off the hills that had always been there. There was no telling, unless one 
kicked ruthlessly and fixed an expert eye on the tell-tale tiredness of the 
stone, that this hill was born last year and that had always been. The other 
mound of gypsum was heaved by the same glistening torsos on to lorries that 
arrived at the end of the week.32 
The image of an earth stripped of resources, divided into piles of valuable minerals and 
waste rock, manifests the injustice of a local population denied adequate compensation 
for the work they perform. Those who do not get to use the finished plaster of Paris are 
the ones who must live with the dust of its extraction. The “tell-tale tiredness of the 
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stone” is itself a telling metaphor, linking the wasted earth with the wasted bodies hired 
to mine it. The men appear autochthonic, emerging as if from the land itself, and will stay 
behind with the ever-weakening earth as its value is carted away.  
Recent theoretical work on the ethics of waste has pointed to such symmetrical 
patterns of human and resource exploitation as fundamental byproducts of capitalist 
production, particularly in the South African context. Zygmunt Bauman has argued that 
processes of exhaustion, breakdown, and disposal are characteristic of all mining, which 
he describes as “an epitome of rupture and discontinuity. The new cannot be born unless 
something is discarded, thrown away or destroyed… Mining is inconceivable without 
waste.”33 As such, mining offers a model for the human toll exacted by global industrial 
capitalism, in which workers are declared redundant or superfluous, and are disposed of 
“because of being disposable.”34 More particularly, there are in Wicomb’s mining scene 
clear parallels with the gold industry that helped build South Africa, and with the 
racialized division of labor behind the extraction that left enormous piles of slag around 
Johannesburg. Born from a series of mining camps that sprung up around the gold reef at 
Witwatersrand, the South African metropolis was in many ways the crucible for a new, 
peculiarly modern kind of economic marginalization. In Johannesburg, the urban signs of 
the triumph of capitalism were quite literally built on the subterranean legacy of 
abandoned shafts once filled with non-white laborers.35 The material excess brought to 
the surface in the form of gold and transformed into other forms of ostentatious wealth 
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belied this human toll: to cite Mbembe once more, “superfluity consisted in the 
vulnerability, debasement, and waste that the black body was subject to and in the racist 
assumption that wasting black life was a necessary sacrifice.”36 In Wicomb’s story, the 
twin piles of rock—one waste and one valuable gypsum—stand in for the broader duality 
of South Africa’s past: a brutal history of economic marginalization buried just beneath 
surface of its paradigmatic city.  
Beyond industrial-scale extraction, Wicomb’s analysis of the economies of waste 
encompasses the relationship of individuals to commodity culture. In “Jan Klinkies,” the 
title character (cousin to Frieda’s father) takes up the refuse of South African consumer 
culture as a form of defense. Frieda and her father have come to visit the eccentric Jan 
and to clean his home. “The gate was barricaded with a hillock of tarnished cans,” Frieda 
tells us, “and as further security the house refuse was heaped in front of it.”37 The full 
significance of Jan’s act of reappropriation, and the reasons for his “defense” of his 
home, are not made clear until the final paragraph of the chapter, when the reader is 
belatedly made aware of the enormous tin can sculpture Jan has made of the tree outside 
his house: “The tree barely moved, but the branches stooping heavily under the hundreds 
of cans tied to them with wire rattled and sent off beams of blinding light at angles 
doubtlessly corresponding to a well-known law.”38 The law in question is not one of 
physics, but of apartheid’s legislated separation; Jan’s obsessive collection of detritus 
stems from the injustice of the Group Areas Act and later discriminatory laws of 
expropriation. We learn that his wife Truida left him when he resisted state pressure to 
move into a coloured location on the Cape Flats; while Truida resigned herself to the loss 
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of their land, and even began to look forward to a new home with “green marbled 
formica” and an “indoor lavatory,” Jan had refused to move.39 While Jan’s mode of 
resistance may be unique, his experience of dispossession was not. In a reading of the 
politics of land use in Nadine Gordimer’s The Conservationist, Rita Barnard has outlined 
the tautological process through which such expropriations operated: black residents were 
presumed to be poor farmers, and were therefore moved to far less agriculturally 
productive lands, at which point their failure to produce crops amidst “the dust and 
poverty where they have been dumped” became proof of their inability to farm.40 By thus 
appealing to ideals of agricultural productivity and efficiency, as well as conservation and 
land stewardship, apartheid land administrators could effectively claim the best land for 
white farmers. At the same time, dispossessed coloured and black farmers were relegated 
to the role of trespassers and defilers of the land, a kind of human trash to be kept away 
from the well-maintained white farms.41 
In Wicomb’s account of the Group Areas Act, waste becomes a means through 
which dispossessed characters reclaim a measure of control over their environment. For 
Jan Klinkies, the combination of the government’s theft of their land and his wife’s 
uncritical acquiescence prompts a breakdown characterized by a host of peculiar habits—
including his tin can collection and his tendency to wear a belt made of wire—which 
gravitate around the material culture of South African society. Having himself been 
abandoned by his government and by his family, Jan cultivates an environment built of 
things thrown away, turning the refuse of the regime into a refusal of its standards and 
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order. However, in barricading his home with the excretions of a capitalist system that 
has marginalized millions of South Africans, Jan achieves more than isolation; he 
approaches new aesthetic forms. Even before we are introduced to the tin can tree, 
obviously a work of diligent, if insane, labor and creativity, Frieda muses on Jan’s 
attachment to the pile of cans before his door while her father clears them away:  
The cans so callously shoved aside might have been placed one by one, 
interrupted by the stepping back to appraise from a distance and perhaps 
replace or reposition. There is the business of balance, for instance; the wrong 
shape could bring the lot toppling down and you’d have to tap sliding cans 
gradually back into place… With such a great number and variety of cans the 
permutations of summit and slope must be endless.42 
There is an irrational logic to the structure, evidence of dedication to a set of principles at 
odds with notions of cleanliness and order. 43 We might locate the rationale behind it in 
Jan’s symbolic disavowal of Afrikaner consumer products: when his cousin offers him 
Boeretroos coffee, for example, Jan refuses the beverage because of the national and 
ethnic associations inherent in the name, which translates as “comfort of the Boers.” 
“Whatcomfortsaboerispoisontome,” he repeats at breakneck speed, until the sentence 
breaks down.44 If what comforts a Boer is poison to him, what poisons a Boer, we may 
surmise, is therefore comfort; or more mildly, what is distasteful to Afrikaners he finds 
somehow salutary.  
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He therefore collects garbage, being careful to strip off any labels that speak of a 
commercialized national Afrikaner identity. Along with avoiding Boeretroos, Jan refuses 
to drink a particular rooibos tea because the imagery on the package depicts the 
Voortrekkers.45 In avoiding such commercialized images, Jan rejects the comforting, 
nation-building myth of Afrikaner endeavor, the brave incursion into the savage heart of 
the land; he refuses to identify with the group that has so callously marginalized him and 
his family, despite the advantages the Shentons see in aligning themselves with their 
European heritage.  Channeling his maddening rage at the losses he has incurred through 
laws of expropriation, Jan Klinkies embraces the detritus of the nation both as an emblem 
of how little he has left and as a mocking tribute to the nation’s material culture.  
Wicomb has elsewhere explored the meaning of such strategic reappropriations of 
material culture. In a 1993 article entitled “Culture Beyond Color,” Wicomb questioned 
the appropriateness of charting a new, multiracial path for South African writing at that 
early stage of decolonization, arguing that the main cultural inheritance South Africa has 
to work with is, regrettably, a culture of violence.46 Her particular example is of the 
practice of “necklacing” in black communities during the apartheid years, in which 
individuals identified as impipis—traitors aligned with the regime—would be publicly 
burned for betraying their community by having a car tire filled with gasoline placed over 
their heads and down around their torsos. It is a horrific way to die, and Wicomb does not 
condone it; rather, she characterizes it as an act of cultural translation from the Afrikaner 
braaivleis, poolside barbecues that could descend into beatings and torture of blacks:  
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Both activities are marked by the iconography of post-industrial culture: the 
swimming pool… is topologically rewritten as the waste from another 
coveted marker of bourgeois culture, the motor car, the discarded tire that is 
placed around the victim’s neck… Necklacing then is about displacing Boer 
culture both physically and symbolically.47 
More violent than Jan Klinkies’ embrace of waste, necklacing nonetheless acts in a 
similar way to subvert a dominant power seen as carried out through material goods and 
practices. Rather than blindly consuming the culturally charged products of a South 
Africa to which he does not fully belong, Jan Klinkies translates those products into an 
ironic protest against expropriation and violence. 
Before leaving Jan Klinkies’ home, Frieda engages in her own act of reclaiming 
waste. Her father asks her to polish Jan’s floor, so as to keep the dust down; the usual 
method for doing this involves a mixture of animal dung, clay, and water. Already, Frieda 
is well used to working with such materials: “One could be fastidious about handling a 
cow-pat with bare hands, but the mixture… loses many of the unpleasant properties of 
freshly released dung… Applied to the floor it is transformed by its function and so 
becomes sweet smelling.”48 Frieda is of course inured against “fastidiousness” by the 
methods required by her environment: commercial cleaning products would be of little 
use on the bare earth floors she and her family inhabit. But there is a tone of recuperation 
at work, too; the final product transcends the impurity of the dung itself, becoming an 
agent of beautification: “the freshly smeared room, just dried, suggests such lush green 
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meadows as the cows have never seen.”49 This revaluation is reinforced when Frieda 
considers dumping the remaining mixture outside: “It seemed a pity to waste it, to pour 
the mixture away in rivulets down a slope or splash it over a ghanna bush, foully 
disfiguring wherever it chanced to land.”50 The sentence traces a journey from waste as a 
misuse of the precious and useful to waste as unwanted excess. At the moment of 
rejection, all value leaves the mixture; it returns to a condition of filth and worthlessness, 
or at the very least, superfluity. But in the moment of its incorporation in the small labors 
of home, the most abject of substances shines with value. 
 
Waste and the Appetites of the Body 
 The tragic center of You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town details Frieda’s trip into 
the city to procure an abortion after she becomes pregnant by her white boyfriend 
Michael. It would be callous to group Jan Klinkies’ fascination with consumer waste and 
earlier depictions of bodily excretions along with Frieda’s abortion, were it not for the 
analogies Frieda herself encourages. Her journey into Cape Town is inseparable from the 
discourses of race inequality, appetite, waste, and morality that pervade the novel. As the 
title story opens, Frieda is alone on the bus into town. She clutches an empty handbag, 
usually an accessory of fashion and consumerism; the handbag is empty, possibly so she 
can hide her growing belly. Or perhaps, given the “package” she must deposit at the end 
of the chapter, it is empty in case the procedure of which she is terrifyingly ignorant 
leaves her with her unborn child to bury. As another passenger on the bus points out, 
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blithely ignorant of the deeper resonance of her statement, Frieda is “dressed to kill.”51 
Frieda admits that she is half-blind to the moral implications of her decision: “No doubt I 
will sail through my final examinations at the end of this year and still not know how I 
dared to pluck a fluttering foetus out of my womb.”52 But though Frieda seems to 
discount the degree of her own understanding of the moral weight of the event, her 
statement shows an awareness that she is crossing a monumental line. In this 
acknowledgement, she implicitly asks herself, and the reader, to consider the ethics of 
rejecting tenuous life, of wasting one body to maintain the order, health, and happiness of 
another. 
 Frieda’s abortion is, on one level, the medical enforcement of what apartheid 
legislation had failed to prevent: another mixed-race child. She and Michael have been 
together for two years, secretly, “steal[ing] whole days, round as globes,”53 but by the 
time she heads into Cape Town, she is aware that their relationship will not survive the 
event of the abortion. Michael has stopped loving her; his insistence that they flee to 
England to be married appears to Frieda as a last-ditch attempt to act honorably given the 
situation.54 She sees in his half-hearted dream of fleeing abroad the fundamental 
impossibility of interracial happiness at home, an acknowledgement that South Africa 
will never welcome their love. For her, both the prospect of flight and the prospect of 
bringing up a mixed-race child in a country that prohibits their creation are too much to 
bear. 
 Battling pious feelings of duty and the sanctity of life, Frieda links her impending 
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abortion to another act of fraught morality: the murder of Prime Minister Hendrik 
Verwoerd, the “architect of apartheid”, on 6 September 1966. In the previous chapter, “A 
Clearing in the Bush,” Frieda had obliquely noted that the assassination had provided her 
with an excuse from finishing a college paper on time, as “a pet abdominal tapeworm 
hissed persuasively into the ear of its Greek host, whose trembling hand grew still for a 
second to aim a fatal shot at the Prime Minister.”55 The tapeworm refers to a statement 
attributed to assassin Dimitri Tsafendas, in which he claimed that an intestinal parasite 
told him he must kill Verwoerd. The metaphor reappears just before Frieda is to meet 
Michael en route to the abortion clinic, as she stares at a display of dried fruit in a Cape 
Town shop. “Desire is a Tsafendas tapeworm in my belly that cannot be satisfied,” she 
says to herself; “Will I stop at just one death?”56 The significance of this analogy is 
radically unstable: Frieda’s meaning slides from the appetite for food that so often arises 
in her in reaction to social anxiety, to the sexual desire she shares with Michael, and 
which has brought about her unwanted pregnancy; along the way, the image links 
Frieda’s abortion to the assassination of a hated political figure. Hunger, sex, and politics 
are aligned on one side; on the other, an unwanted pregnancy and the symbol of South 
African apartheid. It is conceptually easier here to imagine the conflation of desires than 
the conflation of deaths; how, we must ask, is an unborn child like Verwoerd? By the 
brake it places on Frieda’s desire for growth, challenge, and change? Or by the simple 
fact that both beings will die? In this move, the novel deliberately confounds moral 
formulae used to calculate when it is just to end a life, offering only a desperate question 
that plumbs issues of agency and ethics without reaching a stable bottom: “Will I stop at 
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just one death?” Or, put another way, what is the end point of a restless appetite for 
freedom, whether it be political, sexual, or otherwise? 
 Of course, sexual freedom and political freedom intersect in more than one way. 
On the bus ride in to Cape Town, Frieda overhears a neighboring passenger tell another 
about the use of the birth control pill by her employer’s daughter. The daughter’s 
privileged social position enables access to those technologies that facilitate illicit sex by 
safely distancing the questions of illegal backroom abortions and their attendant feelings 
of loss and regret. Frieda’s fellow passenger speaks of the pill as a way of keeping men 
sexually interested without risking pregnancy: otherwise, “who’d have what another man 
has pushed to the side of his plate?... Like this bone,” she says, waving a chicken bone 
stripped of meat and grease.57 In Frieda’s imagination, the bone, symbol of a sexually 
used and discarded woman, morphs into a crucifix, complete with attendant Romans and 
a regretful Judas Iscariot.58  
The image of a betrayal bought with silver reappears following the procedure, 
with the kiss of complicity the abortion provider, Mrs. Coetzee, gives to Frieda, and the 
purse full of money that buys the abortion. Frieda is disgusted by the cheap consolations 
offered by Coetzee as part of the transaction, and is physically repulsed by the “foetid air 
from the mouth of this my grotesque bridegroom with yellow teeth,” who has 
“deflowered” her with a “yellow hand wielding a catheter.”59 As a defense against her 
own visceral reaction to the entire scene, Frieda distances herself from her own body as 
she lies on the couch and undergoes the procedure (“I do not care what happens below. A 
black line of terror separates it from my torso”); it is only through pain at the moment of 
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the foetus’ death that she rediscovers her own body: “Blood spurts from between my legs 
and for a second the two halves of my body make contact through the pain.”60 Once this 
brief reconnection passes, Frieda returns to a position of separation from her own body. 
Pain marks the connection not only of woman and unborn child, but also of perceiving 
mind and feeling body; pain awakens her to these connections at the precise moment that 
they are broken. The blood shed during the operation is from her, but it is not her: “Fear 
and hypocrisy, mine, my deserts spread in a dark stain on the newspaper.”61 That which 
she has hated in herself—her fear of bringing a child into the world while herself so 
young, her hypocrisy in believing in God and the equal rights of all human beings and yet 
rejecting this nascent one—is abjected as beyond the self. The stains left by the blood she 
has shed on the newspaper are the traces of these contradictions, their legacy—they are 
“deserts” in the sense of “that which is deserved,” though Frieda’s diction cannot help but 
conjure the barrenness and emptiness of a desert wasteland. While she in no way leaves 
behind the shame and trauma of her decision to abort her child, her representation of that 
shame as something external to her being is a telling attempt to push away that which 
troubles the image she has created of herself.  
The final act of the chapter entitled “You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town,” in which 
Frieda throws her aborted fetus into a trash can at a generic and anonymous location in 
the city, is at once heartbreaking and intensely complicated. It is shocking precisely in 
that it ties the premature end of one life—the tragic waste—to the world of garbage, the 
quotidian waste. With its shroud of newspaper and its rubbish bin tomb, the package of 
Frieda’s fetus is horrifying in its identity with the trash of twentieth-century fast food: “A 
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newspaper parcel dropped into this dustbin,” Frieda reassures herself, “would absorb the 
vinegary smell of discarded fish and chips wrappings in no time.”62 This conflation of 
precious waste with worthless waste is the moral black hole of the novel, the point to 
which all other considerations of the idea of excess and value gravitate and, once there, 
disappear into incoherence. The tragedy of the final image of the chapter is made no less 
complex by Frieda’s relief at having abandoned the fetus in the bin. For her relief occurs 
in the context of her own abandonment: “I do not know what has happened to God. He is 
fastidious. He fled at the moment that I smoothed the wet black hair before wrapping it 
up. I do not think he will come back.”63 The loss of her idea of God—or perhaps more 
accurately, the loss of the equation she had supposed between her actions and the ideals 
posited by her understanding of God—is significant for Frieda, but it is not sufficient to 
stem her feelings of relief. If, in her mind, God has rejected her, it is also true that she has 
rejected the God that “is not a good listener” and who “withdraws peevishly if his 
demands are not met.”64 That this also entails the loss of her boyfriend Michael—whose 
name, as Sue Marais reminds us,65 means “he who is like God”—adds, however slightly, 
to the tragedy of rejection woven of repressive laws, restrictive morality, and excessive 
desire. 
Frieda’s adjudication of the superfluity of the unborn child—its status as an 
unwanted excess, a remainder in the calculus of human passion—indicates the thin line 
between collective and individual responsibility for vulnerable lives. The impossibility of 
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bearing the mixed-race child indicates the intrusion of apartheid’s logic of racial “purity” 
into individual lives. Frieda finds herself placed in a position of power over another, more 
vulnerable life; faced with a choice between preserving her own health and happiness or 
that of her fetus, she chooses the former. In a 1991 essay, Wicomb expressed dismay that 
the story “You Can’t Get Lost in Cape Town” has been read as being anti-abortion.66 
However, she does not shy away from representing the ethical problems of what can only 
ever be a brutalizing, visceral event, through a language of abandonment that operates 
throughout the novel. Still, if people in this novel can be uncomfortably figured as 
chicken bones, fish and chips, waste earth, and piles of garbage, it is not done without 
deep empathy. Indeed, it is the shock of such equations of the precious and the worthless 
that animate the novel’s moral interrogations.  
Through the personal and historical events it depicts, the narrative struggles to 
come to terms with a world in which human life can be and is discarded and disregarded; 
sometimes this occurs with clear justification, other times muddy, other times manifestly 
flawed, hateful, and illogical. The novel forces the reader to consider whether one can 
ever know adequate justification from inadequate when it comes to making decisions 
about other lives; and yet Wicomb insists that the damning complexity of that question 
should not defer individuals and collectives from considering it. As Frieda tells her 
classmates on the day of Verwoerd’s assassination, “It seems to me as if common 
humanity is harped on precisely so that we don’t have to consider the crucial question of 
whether we can imagine being a particular human being. Or deal with the implications of 
the answer” (54). For Frieda, and for Wicomb, comforting universals are as misguided as 
blanket disavowals. In leading us unflinchingly through Frieda’s encounters with a world 
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that is often cruel, unjust, and hypocritical, Wicomb asks that we consider being that 
other being, embodying that other body, if only to know what it is to reject and to be 
rejected.
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